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Abstract
Query recommendations in search engines is
a double edged sword, with undeniable ben-
efits but potential of harm. Identifying unsafe
queries is necessary to protect users from inap-
propriate query suggestions. However, iden-
tifying these is non-trivial because of the lin-
guistic diversity resulting from large vocabu-
laries, social-group-specific slang and typos,
and because the inappropriateness of a term
depends on the context. Here we formulate
the problem as query-set expansion, where we
are given a small and potentially biased seed
set and the aim is to identify a diverse set of
semantically related queries. We present Pin-
Sets, a system for query-set expansion, which
applies a simple yet powerful mechanism to
search user sessions, expanding a tiny seed set
into thousands of related queries at nearly per-
fect precision, deep into the tail, along with
explanations that are easy to interpret. Pin-
Sets owes its high quality expansion to us-
ing a hybrid of textual and behavioral tech-
niques (i.e., treating queries both as composi-
tional and as black boxes). Experiments show
that, for the domain of drugs-related queries,
PinSets expands 20 seed queries into 15,670
positive training examples at over 99% preci-
sion. The generated expansions have diverse
vocabulary and correctly handles words with
ambiguous safety. PinSets decreased unsafe
query suggestions at Pinterest by 90%.
1 Introduction
Several practical tasks require the identification of
queries in a particular domain. To pick three ex-
amples of topics at different granularities, we may
wish to obtain queries about travel to Paris, about
travel in general, or about drugs. Large collections
of such queries in a domain can be used in multi-
ple fashions to build classifiers, for ad targeting,
for blacklisting, or for enabling users to explore
nearby parts of a semantic space.
One particularly important domain and an ac-
companying practical task is the identification of
unsafe queries and the sanitizing of query sug-
gestions. Query recommendations in search en-
gines can have big positive as well as negative ef-
fects. It has undeniable benefits, since the sugges-
tions not only save typing, more crucially, they en-
able exploration and discovery, introducing users
to unanticipated but relevant regions of the search
space. However, inappropriate suggestions negate
all benefits, resulting in not just a bad user experi-
ence but actual harm. The danger from bad com-
pletions is real: (Baker and Potts, 2013) shows
how Google’s query completions were perceived
as racist, sexist, or homophobic.
1.1 Challenges in Identifying Topical Queries
The technical difficulties involved in obtaining
queries has four big contributors: gigantic vocabu-
lary, ambiguity, platform specificity, and lopsided
data.
The Challenge from Gigantic Vocabularies. In
any given unsafe category (say, porn or illegal
drugs) there is a vast diversity of how people re-
fer to these topics, arising from the real underlying
diversity of content but further enlarged by slang,
social variability in argot, and typos. For example,
there are hundreds of illegal drugs, and marijuana
alone has many dozen names including pot, dope,
ganja, grass, mary jane, reefer and weed. Like-
wise, queries about Paris travel involve names of
attractions or of Paris neighborhoods.
The Challenge from Ambiguity. A single word
can be either safe or unsafe, depending on the con-
text. Grass and weed have perfectly safe mean-
ings, and even words seemingly emblematic of the
“unsafe” class, such as nude, sexy or adult, have
perfectly safe senses: nude lipstick, adult in the
room and sexy car, among many. Adding to this
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Figure 1: Word clouds of queries relating to drugs. The left side shows 20 seed queries. PinSets expanded these to
15,670 unique real queries, at 99%+ precision, encompassing a diverse vocabulary necessary for training a robust
classifier.
challenge, everyday words are routinely co-opted
into unsafe senses, for example, kitty, hole, and
beaver.
The Challenge from Platform Specificity. On-
line platforms naturally differ in the distribution
of concepts they cater to. Queries encountered by
LinkedIn, Google, Pinterest, Zillow, Google Maps
and Pornhub differ, as do the meanings of words
and distribution of senses. This limits the utility of
importing models that have been trained on a very
different distribution and semantics of queries.
The Challenge from Lopsidedness of Real Data.
Any corpus is necessarily imbalanced in various
ways: languages are not equally prevalent, indi-
vidual topics are unequally represented (with a
topic such as home improvements far more preva-
lent than the topic of axe throwing), and labeled
data also unintentionally stress some topics over
others. Many standard statistical techniques, such
as Point-wise Mutual Information (Fano, 1961),
place a heavy significance on even a single co-
occurrence of two rare items (Role and Nadif,
2011), and the lopsidedness adds to classification
difficulties.
Attributes of Effective Training Data. Ex-
panded query lists are often used for training clas-
sifiers. For a machine-learned model to be ef-
fective in the presence of such challenges as di-
verse vocabulary and ambiguous terms, training
data must be abundant; for individual terms such
as nude, it must properly balance examples in safe
vs. unsafe classes; the queries must be diverse, and
make use of a wide swathe of unsafe terms, typos,
and diverse phrasing; and finally, should be plat-
form specific, tuned to the particular distribution
of queries actually encountered.
1.2 Typical Problem Formulation is Textual
Unsafe query identification is typically formulated
as a textual problem: the goal is to map a query
to a safety score based solely on the text of the
query and without making use of prior encounters
with the query. A textual solution is both powerful
and easy to deploy. The power comes from com-
positionality in language: the meaning of a query
[A B C D] typically combines the meaning of its
constituents. Modern machine learning techniques
excel at learning compositional representations.
However, language is not fully compositional.
The safety of a query is not simply the combina-
tion of the safety of its parts. The queries [nude]
and [sexy] are unsafe, but [nude lipstick] and [sexy
car] aren’t. In the other direction, the follow-
ing queries are made up of simple and safe words
but explicitly concern marijuana: [wake and bake]
and [moon rock bud].
Purely textual methods perform sub-optimally
on queries that are non-compositional with the
query’s safety polarity reversed from that of its
constituents.
1.3 Present Work
Here we present PinSets, a mechanism for expand-
ing a tiny number of seed queries into two sets: a
positive set with a very large number of queries of
the same semantic type as the seeds and a nega-
tive set with a large number of queries not of that
type. For instance, 20 seed queries concerning
drugs produced over 15,000 queries about drugs at
over 99.3% precision, and produced about 1.7 mil-
lion non-drug queries at almost perfect precision.
The expansions cover a wide vocabulary, includ-
ing typos and slang. Moreover, queries contain-
ing ambiguous words (such as pot and weed) are
distributed appropriately among the positive and
negative sets. Figure 1 showcases the diverse ter-
minology made accessible by PinSets.
Combining Textual and Behavioral. Our main
insight is that we can combine textual methods
(which “look inside a query” and understand it
compositionally) with statistical behavioral meth-
ods (which consider a query as a black box, as a
single, unanalyzed unit).
Black box methods provide resilience to am-
biguous words. A query (say, [instant pot meal])
may contain an ambiguous term (here, pot), but
the term is not ambiguous in the context of the
full query. When users issue the query, it is of-
ten in sessions containing recipes and cooking. We
learn to associate the full query with those ngrams.
Other queries connected to those ngrams will also
be about cooking, notwithstanding the ambiguity
in the word pot.
The ngrams are obtained by looking within
queries, and this provides us with the generaliza-
tion benefits of compositional models. A query
that uses completely different words, e.g., [pres-
sure cooker dinner], may perhaps never co-occur
in a session with our original query, and yet share
many of the ngrams. This sharing of ngrams
among queries with non-overlapping terms and
which don’t ever co-occur in sessions allows us to
expand to queries with diverse vocabulary. Even
the typo-infested query [intsant pot mael], if seen
often, is likely to have been seen with queries
about cooking and recipes.
Query cohesion within search sessions. A sec-
ond insight may be labeled topic stickiness. A
session consists of queries issued by a single user
in a short time span. Here, we restrict ourselves
to small sessions with between 5 and 20 queries.
For a query q in a session s, if at least three other
queries are about drugs, that is weak evidence that
q is about drugs. By looking at all sessions con-
taining q, we can calculate the fraction of sessions
that are drugs-related, providing us with a drug-
relatedness estimate for q. For many queries, this
fraction will be very high, and for many others,
this will be very low, giving us confident slices of
positive and negative queries. Those with a mid-
dling score (e.g., [high on life] and [club life night-
club]) are potentially ambiguous, and we do not
include them in either set.
Family Resemblance in Query Expansion. Lud-
wig Wittgenstein famously described how mem-
bers of a family resemble each other although no
feature is shared among all members (Wittgen-
stein, 1953). Some members may share a style of
chin, others share eye color, and so forth. Queries
that are about a single topic also have family re-
semblance: many queries about drugs co-occur in
sessions with the word smoke, a different but over-
lapping set of queries share ganja, and so forth.
PinSets identifies ngrams strongly associated with
the seed queries, and each query in the expansion
can be traced to several of these ngrams, an in-
valuable debugging aid. Different queries in the
expansion are central or peripheral depending on
how many of the selected ngrams they are linked
to. In this sense, analogous to human conceptual
categories, the expansion has a graded structure
(Lakoff, 2008).
Resilience to Data Imbalance. The corpus con-
sisting of all sessions naturally has an uneven
distribution of topics. Also, the seed set being
expanded can unintentionally stress some subset.
PinSets’ algorithm utilizes a few tricks to limit the
effect of such imbalance, and is described at the
appropriate stage.
Balancing Ambiguous Terms. Consider three
queries containing the term high: [high eyes
stoner], [riverdale high], and [sky high]. The
first is clearly about drugs, the next clearly not,
and the last is ambiguous, with a drugs-related
sense and with a non-drugs sense. PinSets cleanly
classifies these because the first occurs often with
other drugs-related queries, the second never does,
and the last one does sometimes. For this rea-
son, the relative distribution of queries contain-
ing high within the positive class and the negative
class mimics its meaning in reality.
Explainable Model. For each stages of the ex-
pansion process, we get human readable explana-
tions. In rare cases where some seed is resulting
in bad expansions, it is easy to detect this because
we can work backward from an unexpected query,
and each stage is readable, made up of words in-
stead of inscrutable numbers.
Hybrid Serving Model for Classifiers. When
PinSets expansions are used to train a deep-
learned textual model (such as fastText (Joulin
et al., 2016)), it performs well because the training
data represents ground data well. But because tex-
tual models have trouble with non-compositional
queries, the trained model can still misclassify ex-
Figure 2: Examples of query suggestions at Pinter-
est. Apart from query completions for incomplete
queries (not shown in this figure), Pinterest shows
search guides containing query refinements (at the top)
and related recommended stories (lower right). Queries
play a role in the identification of candidate sugges-
tions.
amples from the training data. One such misclassi-
fied example from our experiment is [durban poi-
son], an obscure name for one strain of marijuana.
This is rare in queries, and the fastText model does
not latch on to its unsafe sense.
Despite this drawback, there is good reason to
use deep-learned models in production: they are
easy to deploy, and given that language is in fact
compositional to a large extent, they work well, in-
cluding for unseen queries. Training queries mis-
classified by the trained model are not numerous,
and we can easily load these disagreements and
thus obtain a hybrid model, combining the be-
havioral characteristics for frequently seen queries
and fastText’s generalizing capability for unseen
and rarely seen queries.
2 Location in Pinterest’s Ecosystem
Expanded query sets have many applications all
across Pinterest. Here we consider the specific ap-
plication of query suggestions, which play a role in
multiple Pinterest features. These include search
auto-complete (which suggests completions for a
partially typed query), search guides (which sug-
gest related topics for a given search), recom-
mended search stories and recommended search
emails. They play a key factor for improving Pin-
terest’s popularity as they help users find search
topics that may best fit into their interests. Figure
2 shows some examples of query suggestions.
Each of these use cases has the potential to sur-
Autocomplete
Search Recommendation Products
Related Search Stories
Content Safety Service
Guide
Text Classifier
(ML model)
...
Other Techniques
Figure 3: The Content Safety Service (purple) is the
intermediary between user facing surfaces (blue) and
internal details of query safety evaluation (orange and
red).
face unsafe queries, and we therefore do auto-
mated detection and filtering before query recom-
mendations from any search product are shown to
the user.
Pinterest has a centralized service that handles
query safety for all these use cases. In Figure 3 the
purple box is the central safety clearinghouse that
serves the products represented by the blue boxes.
Under the hood, it uses a deep learned classifier
(orange box), along with other techniques neces-
sary for blocking emerging threats that call for an
urgent response (red box).
Most of the training data for the deep learned
model comes from PinSets. This is augmented
with some historical human rated data.
3 How PinSets Works
Apart from the seed queries, PinSets also uses
query sessions. Let Q be the universe of queries.
A single query session s ⊂ Q is a set of queries
made by a single user in a short duration, and C
is our corpus of all sessions containing between
5 and 20 queries. For this discussion, we restrict
ourselves to English query sessions, but the tech-
nique is language agnostic.
Algorithm 1 describes the expansion in broad
brushstrokes. We produce the weighted bipartite
graph B only once for the corpus C of sessions
(details in Algorithm 2). Each seed set reuses
the same graph. PinSets expands the seed queries
(S) in two phases. The first phase (Section 3.4,
Algorithm 3) expands S to I, which only con-
tains queries from the head and torso (i.e., queries
seen in at least a hundred sessions). The second
phase (Section 3.5, Algorithm 4) scores all queries
seen in the corpus. The positive training set P
is those queries above a particular score thresh-
old (tp), whereas the negative training set N is
queries below a different, lower threshold (tn, with
tn < tp). Queries with score in the range [tn, ts]
are not part of either sets.
3.1 Queries, Ngrams, and Their Bipartite
Graph
A query ngram is a unigram or a bigram in a query.
We naı¨vely split on space to obtain ngrams, and
this can be replaced with more linguistically mo-
tivated splits. A co-occurring ngram for query q
in session s is an ngram of some query in session
s such that it is not an ngram of query q. Thus, if
a session has two queries [a b c] and [c d e], then
the co-occurring ngrams for the first query in this
session are d, e, c d and d e but not c.
We preprocess the corpus C once into a bipar-
tite graph B with queries on one side and ngrams
from queries on the other. In this bipartite graph,
a query q is connected to ngram n if n is strongly
co-occurring with q. The mathematical properties
of this association strength are crucial, and require
their own section (Section 3.2).
Note that B only contains queries and ngrams
seen in at least a hundred sessions, and thus repre-
sents the head and the torso of Pinterest queries.
3.2 Preprocessing: Association Strength in B
Of central importance are the weights of edges
connecting a query q with an ngram n, and our
choice of association strength is driven by two
concerns:
1. deal appropriately with the lopsided empha-
sis that any real corpus exhibits. Real data
is necessarily uneven in various ways: differ-
ent languages are unevenly represented (for
instance, in our data, English is far more
prevalent than German which is more preva-
lent than Swahili) and different topics are un-
evenly represented (e.g., fashion and home
decor are more prevalent than numismatics),
and
2. place greater faith in ngrams typically seen
with a query.
Commonly used association strength measures
such as Point-wise Mutual Information (PMI)
overestimate the strength between rare items (Role
and Nadif, 2011). Let |C| be the number of ses-
sions in our corpus, |q| be the number of sessions
with query q, |n| be the number of sessions with
ngram n, and c(q, n) be the number of sessions
where n co-occurred with q. How frequently do
we expect to see q and n together by chance?
That number is |n||q|/|C|. This estimate will be
much less than 1 when both q and n are rare, and
even a single observation of the two together will
lead to a high PMI. Thus, a Swahili query and a
Swahili ngram will tend to have very high asso-
ciation strengths arising from the rarity of these
relative to the entire corpus.
Placing greater faith in “typically seen” can be
explained by the following example. If a query
q is associated with two ngrams, n1 and n2, with
|n1| = 100, c(q, n1) = 10, |n2| = 500, c(q, n2) =
50, then the PMI will treat both ngrams as equally
strongly associated with q, but we would like to
prefer n2, which is less likely to be a statistical
fluke.
We develop a new scoring function based on (1)
and (2) for association strength (Equation 1). The
first component of the sum is a PMI variant inde-
pendent of the corpus size |C| (addressing concern
1), and the second component is a correction ad-
dressing concern 2.
w(q, n) = log
c(q, n)2
|q||n| + log
c(q, n)
|q| (1)
The construction of the bipartite graph B take
one parameter: the association strength thresh-
old tw (a suitable value is -18). If q and n have
association strength w(q, n), we retain the edge
only if w(q, n) > tw, and set the edge weight to
w(q, n)−tw, thereby making all edges have a pos-
itive weight.
3.3 B: Mixing The Behavioral and The
Textual
The bipartite graphB contains, on one side, textual
elements obtained by “looking inside” queries:
these are the ngrams from queries. B also con-
tains, on the other side, queries as black boxes:
these are full queries whose internal structure
is not inspected: it matters not if they are sin-
gle words or ten word queries with exclamation
marks. This mixing has benefits that should be
pointed out.
Illustrative Example. To show the benefits, we
will look at queries most closely related to the
query [maryjane smoke], namely, those most eas-
ily reached by a random walk of length 2 starting
Algorithm 1 Overall expansion algorithm.
Input
C Corpus of sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Each session is a set of queries
S Seed queries to expand
Output
P queries strongly related to S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Used as positive examples for training classifier
N queries strongly unrelated to S . . . . . . . . Like above, but negative. Not the complement of P
Create bipartite graph B . . . . . . . . . . . . . Done once and reused. See Sections 3.1–3.2 and Algorithm 2
Expand S to head and torso, producing I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . See Section 3.4 and Algorithm 3
Score all queries as they relate to I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . See Section 3.5 and Algorithm 4
Two different thresholds produce P and N
Algorithm 2 Generating bipartite graph B.
Input
C Corpus of sessions
HyperParameters
tw Association strength threshold
Output
B bipartite graph with queries to ngrams
|q| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Number of sessions with query q
|n| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Number of sessions with ngram n
c(q, n) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Number of sessions with q cooccuring with n
w(q, n)← log c(q,n)2|q||n| + log c(q,n)|q| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Association strength, 3.2
a(q, n)← w(q, n)− tw . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Edge weight; (q, n) ∈ B iff a(q, n) > 0
weed smoke bangs mary jane
marijane marijuana smoke cannabis
jane weedlover stoner girl
stoner bongs smoker weedgirl
420 blunts medical marijuana
kush marijuanna maryjane watson
Table 1: Some ngrams associated with [maryjane
smoke]. That is, sessions with the query [maryjane
smoke] frequently contains these ngrams.
at that query. That is, we will look at some ngrams
connected to this query, and at other queries con-
nected to some of these ngrams. The goal here is
to show how the mixed structure allows for queries
with completely different words to be closely re-
lated, while at the same time be immune to ambi-
guity of the words in the query.
Table 1 shows some of the top ngrams associ-
ated with the query [maryjane smoke]. Recall that
these are ngrams seen much more than expected
in sessions containing this query. This is a drugs
related query, and naturally there are many drug
related terms. The word maryjane is ambiguous:
it is the first name of Spider-man’s friend, for in-
stance. Most of the related ngrams are about drugs
(such as the typo marijuanna), although we also
see Spider-man’s friend, Maryjane Watson, with a
weak connection. Although the query contains an
ambiguous term, the query itself is not ambiguous,
and the query’s internal words have no effect on its
outgoing edges; only the full query’s meaning has
effect, since that is what drives users to use it with
other queries in a session.
Top queries associated with the ngram “mari-
juanna” are shown in Table 2, and are clearly drugs
related. Many of the same queries are also associ-
ated with the other ngrams shown in Table 1, and
would be reached with high likelihood by a ran-
dom walk. Note the diverse vocabulary in these
queries. To reemphasize, the reason these queries
are associated with ngrams such as marijuanna is
because of the meaning of the full query, not of
potentially ambiguous terms within. Queries as-
sociated with Spider-man are far less likely to be
reached given the single shared ngram between
that query and [maryjane smoke].
Furthermore, note that we are capable of iden-
[weed] [cannabutter recipes] [edible recipes cannabutter]
[pot] [marijuanan leaf] [joints and blunts]
[mariju] [marijuanan tattoo] [pipes and bongs]
[ganja] [weedlover] [weed brownies]
[420] [joint] [420 party]
Table 2: Some queries associated with ngram marijuanna. That is, sessions with these queries often contain the
ngram marijuanna.
tifying the relatedness of two rare queries about
drugs even if each is individually found in very
few sessions and the two are jointly found in no
session. The other ngrams in the few sessions with
these queries are the glue.
All this suggests that even a simple random
walk over B leads to a good expansion. But we can
do better, taking a page from the Category Builder
algorithm (Mahabal et al., 2018), as we see next.
3.4 Phase 1: Extend to Head and Torso
In this first phase of expanding seeds S to head-
and-torso queries, we first identify a weighted set
of diagnostic ngrams (F) for this set of seeds. We
treat the seeds as a weighted set (with all weights
being 1).
The score of an ngram n depends on three fac-
tors: the weights of edges in B connecting S
to n, its precision, and its recall (these are de-
fined below). Low precision is associated with
overly generic ngrams and low recall exists when
an ngram is associated with just one or two seeds,
indicating that it may not represent the crux of the
seed set. Given these weighted ngrams, the same
technique produces a weighted set of queries (I).
Hyper-parameters. Three hyper-parameters con-
trol the score. Two parameters, ρ and τ , control
for penalty for low recall and precision, respec-
tively. The third parameter, σ, is needed as pro-
tection against lopsidedness inadvertently present
in the seed set. An extreme example of such lop-
sidedness occurs if we are expanding a seed set
of all kinds of unsafe queries at once. In such a
scenario, porn queries vastly outnumber all other
types, and the scores of queries in the final expan-
sion are similarly dominated by porn. Even in a
more targeted seed set, there is unintended imbal-
ance. To account for this, when scoring ngrams,
we limit the maximum number of seeds that can
contribute to a score to σ, and also limit, in the
calculation for an ngrams’ recall, how many seeds
it must be connected to for a perfect recall.
The recall for an ngram is the fraction of seeds
the ngram is connected to and precision is the
fraction of that ngram’s neighbors that are seeds.
These numbers are adjusted based on the parame-
ter σ.
Algorithm 3 lists the precise calculations for
identifying ngrams. Exactly the same equations,
treating F as the seeds, produces a weighted set of
queries, I.
3.5 Phase 2: Extend Deep into the Tail
The second phase is purely behavioral. For each
session s ∈ C, we count how many queries from I
are present, |s ∩ I|. For each unique query q, we
count the following:
• t is the number of sessions containing query
q.
• u is the number of unsafe sessions containing
q. For a session s to be unsafe we need to
see three other unsafe queries (i.e., if q ∈ I,
we require |s ∩ I| ≥ 4 otherwise we require
|s ∩ I| ≥ 3.
• The score for the query is a smoothed version
of the ratio u/t. Specifically, we use (u +
1)/(t + 30) to prevent spurious high scores
for rare queries.
The positive training data P consists of queries
seen in at least 10 sessions with a score of at least
0.1, and the negative training dataN is made up of
queries seen in at least 300 sessions with a score
below 0.005.
3.6 Deep Learning and Hybrid Serving
The sets P and N are used to train a deep-learned
textual model M that can evaluate the safety of
seen and unseen queries. It is a textual solu-
tion, and naturally limited in its ability to handle
non-compositional queries. We therefore identify
training examples where the model disagrees with
Algorithm 3 Phase 1 Expansion. This is applied twice: to obtain weighted ngrams from seeds (Phase
1A), and obtaining queries from these ngrams (Phase 1B).
Input
S Input seeds. w(s) is weight of a seed
B Bipartite graph
HyperParameters
σ Seed support size, default 50
ρ Low recall penalty, default 3.0
τ Low precision penalty, default 0.5
ti Output score threshold (only Phase 1B), default 10−4
Output
F Phase 1A: the top 1000 ngrams by score
I Phase 1B: queries scoring above ti
N(n)← {q|(q, n) ∈ B} . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . neighbors of n
S(n)← N(n) ∩ S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. seeds associated with n
Sσ(n) ⊆ S(n) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . σ of the most strongly associated seeds
r(n)← |S(n)||S| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . recall for n
rσ(n)← |Sσ(n)|
min (|S|, σ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. adjusted recall for n
p(n)← |S(n)||N(n)| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . precision for n
pσ(n)← |S(n)|
max (|N(n)|, σ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. adjusted precision for n
uσ(n)←
∑
q∈Sσ(n)w(q)B(q, n) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . uncorrected score for n
aσ(n)← uσ(n)rσ(n)ρpσ(n)τ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . final score for n
Algorithm 4 Phase 2 Expansion.
Input
C Corpus of sessions
I Queries identified in Phase 1
HyperParameters
tp Score threshold for positive data
tn Score threshold for negative data
Output
P queries strongly related to S
N queries strongly unrelated to S
|q| ← |{s|q ∈ s}| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Number of sessions with q
if q ∈ I then
u(q)← |{s|q ∈ s, |s ∩ I| ≥ 4}| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sessions with 3 other unsafe
else
u(q)← |{s|q ∈ s, |s ∩ I| ≥ 3}| . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Sessions with 3 other unsafe
end if
a(q)← u(q) + 1|q|+ 30 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. smoothed unsafe session fraction
P← {q|a(q) ≥ tp} . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Above threshold is positive
N← {q|a(q) ≤ tn} . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Below another threshold is negative
the behavioral data, and this relatively small num-
ber of queries is easy to load and use in deciding
query safety.
4 Experiment: Expanding Drug Seeds
We begin with 20 seed queries concerning drugs
(shown in Table 3). The two phase expansion
process produced 4,711 head-and-torso queries
(INTERMEDIATE) and expanding these lead to
15,670 drugs-related queries (DRUGS) and 1.7
million queries not about drugs (NON-DRUGS).
We used human raters to evaluate the quality of
INTERMEDIATE, DRUGS, and NON-DRUGS. For
each of those three sets, we sampled 2,000 queries
(INTERMEDIATE-RATED, DRUGS-RATED, and
NON-DRUGS-RATED) for human rating.
Further, we trained a fastText
model, with the positive examples be-
ing (DRUGS − DRUGS-RATED) and
the negative examples sampled from
(NON-DRUGS − NON-DRUGS-RATED), and
looked at the errors made by this model.
4.1 Evaluation Methodology
The three evaluation sets of 2,000 queries each
(i.e, INTERMEDIATE-RATED, DRUGS-RATED,
and NON-DRUGS-RATED) were sent to human
raters. Raters used the Pinterest standard format
for evaluating safety, classifying each query as ei-
ther safe or assigning it to one of several unsafe
categories, one of which is Drugs.
Each query was rated by five raters, and we used
majority rating to assign categories to queries. if a
query gets “Drugs” as the majority vote, we con-
sider it to be about drugs. Note that non-drugs can
still be unsafe for other reasons (such as porn or
graphic violence).
4.2 Phase 1 Expansion
Phase 1 expansion identified 210 diagnostic
ngrams (Table 4) and an expanded set of 4,711
head-and-torso queries (Table 5).
Diagnostic ngrams (F). One of the top scor-
ing diagnostic ngrams is marijuana, which is as-
sociated with six of the seed queries, and gets
a final score of 0.01. This low score is caused
by the small seed set and the fact that mari-
juana is connected to over 6,000 queries, giv-
ing it a low perceived precision. More precise
ngrams (i.e., with fewer non-seed queries) include
methanphetamines, which is connected to just one
seed but also just 56 queries in all. We also see
more generic ngrams. One example is quotes,
which is connected to a single seed and about half
a million queries overall, resulting in the very tiny
score of 1.3 ∗ 10−8. If we had started with a hun-
dred seeds instead of with just 20, these generic
features get dropped when we keep the top thou-
sand ngrams.
Phase 1 Expansion (INTERMEDIATE).
4,711 head and torso
queries were observed with a score above
10−4, and some of these are shown in Table 5.
One of the highest scoring queries is [smoke
weed everyday], which is associated with a total
of 177 ngrams, 35 of which are in F . Even a
relatively obscure, typo-ridden query such as
[easy marijuanna edible recipes] is associated
with 19 ngrams in Fand thus scores highly in the
expansion. The queries [spider man maryjane]
and [j scott campbell spiderman] end up with a
score below 10−8, much below the threshold, and
are thus not part of the 4,711 queries.
Human evaluation of INTERMEDIATE-
RATED. These 2,000
queries are expected to be drugs related, and
97.9% of them indeed get a majority label of
“Drugs”, as seen in Table 7. It is instructive to
look at the 42 queries that don’t get a majority
label of “Drugs” (Table 6).
Several of these queries are short and typos
(such as [ganza], [hasis], and [drigs], which are
likely typos for ganja, hashish, and drugs), and
more importantly, these are used by users in the
same session as drug related terms, and thus may
lead to drugs-related content despite typos.
Others are foreign language of technical terms,
such as [chillum] and [ruderalis], the latter being
the botanical name of one strain of cannabis.
The final row in the table displays more prob-
lematic errors: things that perhaps co-occur with
drugs but represent a semantic drift and are cer-
tainly not, in and of themselves, drugs-related. We
see in the next subsection how these errors get
cleaned up by phase 2.
4.3 Phase 2 Expansion
The expansion resulted in 15,670 unique queries in
DRUGS and around 1.7 million unique queries in
NON-DRUGS. The NON-DRUGS examples span
the gamut of Pinterest queries.
[marijuana pills] [cannabis black and white]
[drugs meth crystals] [weed be good together]
[weed jewlery] [magic mushshroom psychedelic]
[ketamine sniff] [cbd lemonade]
[canabis indica] [growing marajuana beginners seeds]
[meth head] [baked stoner]
[cannabis sativa oil] [mdma aesthetic]
[box of weed] [canabis growing outdoor]
[weed for pain] [marijuanna colors]
[maryjane smoke] [marijuanna edible recipes cannabis oil]
Table 3: (Experiment) 20 drugs-related seed queries.
cannabis sativa stoner sativa
pain medical cannabis drugs
sativa plants marijuana weed
beginners outdoor drug lsd
maryjane tattoo mdma molly of meth
Table 4: (Experiment) Some of the 210 diagnostic
ngrams associated with the 20 seed queries in Table 3.
[addiction photography] [art weed]
[420 aesthetic] [estacy]
[edible recipes cannibus] [lad]
[marijuana pipes] [stoner decor]
[weed pipes] 70s weed
[#indica] [marihuana art]
[stoner tattoo] [baddies smoking]
[hemp oil] [drug addict aesthetic]
[smoking pipe bowls] [bong tattoo]
Table 5: (Experiment) A few of the 4,711 queries ob-
tained in Phase I by expanding the 20 seeds.
[addict] [grower] [chillum]
[drigs] [drogs] [ganza]
[maconh] [maconhaa] [maconharia]
[edinles] [ruderalis] [hasis]
[red eyes] [smoking] [alcohol]
Table 6: (Experiment) Queries in Phase I expansion
without “Drugs” as the majority human rating. Some of
the 42 such queries (out of the 2,000 rated) are shown.
Note the several typos for drugs and foreign terms for
drugs. The last row drifts the most from drugs.
# Queries PinSets fastText
INTERMEDIATE 4,771 97.9% 92.5%
DRUGS 15,670 99.3% 95%
NON-DRUGS 1,735,286 100.0% 100%
Table 7: (Experiment) Human evaluation of expansion
based on majority vote among five raters. The rows cor-
respond to Phase 1 expansion (INTERMEDIATE), and
the positive and negative output of Phase 2 (DRUGS
and NON-DRUGS). In each case, 2,000 queries were
sent to raters. The last two columns report precision
for PinSets and a fastText model (Section 4.4).
Human Evaluation. 2,000 queries were sampled
from NON-DRUGS. Not a single query was clas-
sified as drugs-related, implying 100% purity of
this sample. 2,000 queries were sampled from
DRUGS, and 1986 of this had a majority rating
drugs, representing a 99.3% purity of this sam-
ple. Table 8 lists the 14 queries where majority
vote was not “drugs”, and even these are close to
being drugs-related. Some are foreign language
queries about drugs, other typos for drugs-related
queries, and some about the tobacco weed used to
roll marijuana blunts. The lower 6 queries repre-
sent the greatest semantic drift, and concern vap-
ing, psychedelic art, and the medicine Zantac.
4.4 Classifier Trained on Phase 2 Output
As previously remarked, a textual classifier has
trouble with compositional queries. We trained a
fastText classifier with phase 2 output (but not us-
ing those queries sent to human raters). Human
evaluation of the classifier revealed a 95% preci-
sion on DRUGS, although it had a perfect score
on NON-DRUGS. The misclassified 5% has sev-
eral non-compositional queries that reuse common
words in unusual ways, for example, Durban poi-
son (a South African marijuana variety) and Moon
Queries Comments
[droga], [drogue] Spanish and French for drug
[maconhaa papeis de parede] Spanish, “Marijuana wallpaper”
[metg], [tripy], [wed] Typo for meth, trippy, and weed
[backwood arts] tobacco leaf for rolling weed
[backwood tumblr] tobacco leaf for rolling weed
[cute wax pen], [pen battery] concerns vaping
[429] inscription on zantac
3 queries re: psychedelic art 3 such queries
Table 8: (Experiment) These 14 queries (out of 2000 rated) did not get “Drugs” as majority vote. The upper 8 are
arguably drugs-related, and even the lower 6 are in the semantic vicinity.
Rock bud (cannabis buds dipped in hash). Table 9
shows some of these queries.
4.5 Handling Ambiguity
Both weed and pot are ambiguous terms, and typi-
cally safe in Pinterest query streams. How well do
we tell apart the needles (i.e., unsafe uses of these
terms) from the haystack? A query with pot is 250
times likelier to be in the safe training data than
in unsafe. PinSets’ behavioral component makes
it robust to the textual ambiguity represented by
the word pot, resulting in highly accurate training
data, as can be observed from Table 10. Weed has
the same story, as seen in Table 11.
5 Effect on Pinterest Query
Recommendation Safety
Making search recommendation safe is one of the
top priorities of Pinterest. In an earlier iteration
(before PinSets), we used a fastText model trained
on human labeled queries and on unsafe query ex-
pansions reported by users.
We regularly monitor the safety of suggested
queries by sampling queries and getting these
rated by human raters. We monitor unsafe sug-
gestions in all our unsafe categories (Drugs, Porn,
etc), and can thus evaluate the impact of model
changes on overall safety.
We used PinSets to generate additional training
data. Starting with known unsafe seed queries in
each unsafe domain, we produced a large, scored
collection of unsafe queries. Top 5000 of these
were sent to human raters, and these were 97% ac-
curate. The human raters also assigned categories
to the expanded queries, and these clean queries
were used as new seeds to identify over a mil-
lion unique unsafe queries. These newly identi-
fied queries form the bulk of overall training data,
accounting for over 80% of unique queries.
When we augmented the training data with
these additional queries generated by PinSets, our
routine measurements showed a 90% drop in un-
safe suggestions. Some domains with very large
vocabularies but relative rarity in the query stream,
such as drugs, saw even larger drops.
One danger with such a high drop in unsafe
query suggestion is the potential for collateral
damage: maybe we are removing safe suggestions
as well as unsafe, and this will show up as, for in-
stance, a drop in certain metrics of user engage-
ment. We also monitor these metrics, and the
launch of the improved model was neutral (with
under 1%), suggesting that safe queries were not
harmed.
5.1 Hybrid Serving
Although the deep learned system has been trained
on data obtained using queries’ historical engage-
ment, it is itself a purely textual model basing
its decision only on the query text. For non-
compositional queries, the fastText model is less
accurate than the training data used.
If we treat the training data as golden, we
observe the following. Among known unsafe
queries, fastText is quite accurate: it classifies
99.12% queries correctly. Among known safe, it
clocks in at 97% correct, and thus errs on the side
of caution.
Misclassified queries include those with ty-
pos (intentional or otherwise): [#cu¨m], [death
quoats], [panic attach relief], [bo¨o¨ty,] and [cøck].
Among false positives, we see examples with a
typically unsafe term: [nailart nude shape], [hot
wheels cake 4], [crockery unit cum bar], [beat up
truck].
A class of queries that is hard to handle compo-
Queries Comments
weex; estacy; mary hane; kusg; acud; mary jame; schrooms typos
molly; methed up; marwana slang
durban poison; moon rock bud; supercropping exotic slang?
snort coke The term Coke, for Coca Cola, is usually safe
Table 9: (Experiment) Some unsafe queries misclassified as non-drugs by fastText.
In NON-DRUGS In DRUGS
[soups in a crock pot] [edibles pot candy]
[flower pot ideas] [pot cookies weed recipes]
[one pot pasta] [grow room pot]
[pot luck ideas] [smoking tips pot]
[liquid smoke instant pot] [pot smoke]
Table 10: (Experiment) Safe and unsafe queries containing pot, as classified by PinSets. Among unsafe uses, we
saw 278 unique queries asked 49K times, where as safe uses were 6K unique queries asked 13 million times. The
last row shows that even the joint presence of smoke and pot doesn’t necessarily render a query unsafe.
sitionally concerns an area Pinterest deeply cares
about: mental health. Queries that co-occur with
other queries clearly about sadness or depression
are often hard to fathom as a combination of their
individual terms: [there is no hope] and [its over].
For queries seen frequently, we can be confi-
dent of the safety or lack thereof, and thus trust
such data more, allowing it to trump the fastText
model for these queries. We need not load all these
queries, however: if need only to store cases where
the two models disagree, and this is small enough
to be loaded without impacting latency.
6 Related Work
Set Expansion. Set Expansion is the well studied
problem of expanding a given set of terms by find-
ing other semantically related terms (Wang and
Cohen, 2007; Shen et al., 2017). Our Phase 1 ex-
pansion is based most closely on our prior work,
namely the Category Builder algorithm (Mahabal
et al., 2018), but with additional innovations like
accounting for imbalanced seed emphasis via the
τ hyper-parameter. The mixing of textual and be-
havioral (which gives protection against ambigu-
ity but still gets generalization benefits of compo-
sitionality) is novel.
Expanding query-sets to generate training
data. Mining an unlabeled corpus of queries to
augment a small known set of labeled examples
with a much larger set of pseudo-labeled exam-
ples is a form of semi-supervised learning. This is
often treated as label propagation via graph trans-
duction on a homogeneous graph (Zhu et al., 2005;
Elezi et al., 2018). Phase 1 of our approach uses
a heterogeneous graph (with queries and ngrams),
with the ensuing benefits already noted.
Another formulation often used is that of clas-
sification for expansion, where the limited labeled
data is used to train a classifier which is then used
to classify the unlabeled data, resulting in much
larger training data for the final model. This ap-
proach is used by (Wulczyn et al., 2017) to clas-
sify personal attacks, and they expand 100K hu-
man labeled comments to 63M machine labeled.
The classifier is textual, however, and ambiguous
terms that the original classifier did not learn well
will be mishandled in the expansion, something
PinSets does not suffer from, and of course such
an approach is a non-starter if we start with only a
few dozen seeds.
Unsafe Text Identification. Much research in this
domain concerns machine learning models appro-
priate for identifying unsafe text (Yenala et al.,
2018; Zhang et al., 2018; Xiang et al., 2012). As
such, this line of work is orthogonal to the present
work and the two can be used jointly: we produce
training data that can be used by these models.
A large fraction of unsafe text identification
work concerns longer forms of text, such as tweets
and messages (e.g, (Pant et al., 2019; Yenala et al.,
2018; Wulczyn et al., 2017; Xiang et al., 2012;
Zhang et al., 2018)). These longer forms have
been noted to be easier since they offer more con-
text (Yenala et al., 2018), which a short query such
as [cøck] clearly doesn’t. Our black-box approach
In NON-DRUGS In DRUGS
[butterfly weed] [weedgirls stoner girl smoke weed]
[diy weed killer] [buy weed medical marijuana]
[horny goat weed] [badass weed wallpaper]
[barrett wilbert weed] [smoke weed tricks]
[sea weed] [buy weed how to]
[weed identification] [ganjaa wallpapers smoking weed]
[tumble weed] [420 humor smoking weed]
Table 11: (Experiment) Safe and unsafe queries containing weed, as classified by PinSets.
infers context from the session rather than from
within the query , allowing us to maintain high
precision when classifying shorter text.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
The immense diversity of vocabulary in a domain
can be accessed by a combination of techniques,
utilizing the topic stickiness of sessions and ex-
ploiting the fact that a query is not ambiguous
to the user issuing it and that we can exploit the
user’s behaviour, as revealed by their word choice
in other queries they issue just before or after.
The ideas presented here are language agnos-
tic with one English-specific exception that won’t
generalize well to languages such as Thai: the
naı¨ve, white-space-based tokenization. Future
work should ensure applicability to a wider range
of languages.
Although we focused here on query safety, the
mechanisms are widely applicable, and in subse-
quent work we are looking into enriching queries
associated with taxonomies of user interests.
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